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Security Findings Register

Findings observed during lab discovery and ongoing operations. Each finding has a target phase for remediation and is tracked through to closure.

Process: When a SEC-* item is closed, update the status here and note the PR/commit that resolved it.

Active Findings

ID Finding Severity Target Phase Status
SEC-002 VLANs are organizationally segmented but no inter-VLAN firewall rules enforce isolation. A compromised IoT or Security-VLAN device can reach the Servers VLAN. Medium Phase 7 Closed — ZBF enabled on UDM, 8 custom policies verified via API scan (2026-05-15). See docs/architecture/firewall-policy.md
SEC-003 DSM HTTP/HTTPS (5000/5001) forwarded from public internet. DSM has a recurring CVE history; access should require Tailscale. Medium Phase 7 Closed — port forwards deleted from UDM (2026-05-15). DSM accessible only via Tailscale at 100.71.93.130; off-LAN verified 2026-06-19
SEC-004 Port-forward omgwtfbbq to 192.168.1.84:9001. Purpose unknown; operator does not recall creating it. Medium Phase 0.5 (investigate) / Phase 7 (remediate) Closed — port forward deleted from UDM (2026-05-15)
SEC-005 All four WiFi SSIDs share the same networkconf_id and land on VLAN 1 (GenPop). The EAP-secured SSIDs likely intend tier separation that isn't network-enforced. Low-Medium Phase 7 Closed — SSID network assignments updated and verified via API (2026-05-15). IsThisTheKrustyKrab → Personal, HotSignalsInYourArea → IoT, Rebellious Amish Family → Appliances
SEC-006 Tailscale node recordurbate health-check warning: advertising routes but --accept-routes=false. Cosmetic/operational, not exploitable, but should be fixed when the node comes under management. Low Phase 3 Closedtailscale set --accept-routes applied (2026-05-12)
SEC-007 Tailscale tailnet has 6+ nodes offline for 53-590 days. Confirmed as real devices to be rehydrated. Evaluate retention policy and ACL hygiene. Low Phase 0.5 (audit) / Phase 7 (ACL policy) Closed — ACL in infra/tailscale/acl.json; GitHub Action sync green (2026-06-19, run 27811413868)
SEC-008 DSM admin UI exposed via SEC-003 forwards. 2FA must be confirmed on all DSM admin accounts as a compensating control until SEC-003 closes. Medium Phase 0 (confirm 2FA) Closed — 2FA, AutoBlock, Account Protection confirmed (2026-05-11); SEC-003 closed 2026-05-15

Compensating Controls

SEC-008: DSM 2FA Verification (historical)

SEC-003 is closed. This section records the verification performed while DSM was still WAN-reachable:

All DSM admin accounts must have 2FA enabled. Verified 2026-05-11:

  1. Log in to DSM at https://<synology-ip>:5001
  2. Go to Control Panel > User & Group
  3. For each user with admin privileges:
    • Click the user, go to the Security tab (or Personal > Security for your own account)
    • Confirm 2-Step Verification is enabled
    • If Adaptive MFA is available (DSM 7.2+), enable it
  4. Under Control Panel > Security > Account:
    • Enable Auto Block (10 failed attempts in 5 minutes)
    • Enable Account Protection to lock accounts after repeated failures

Note

DSM is reachable only via Tailscale (100.71.93.130:5001) since 2026-05-15. SEC-001 (public SMB) closed 2026-06-21 — see closed findings.

Closed Findings

ID Closed Resolution
SEC-002 2026-05-15 ZBF policies applied on UDM
SEC-001 2026-06-21 Verified absent from UDM port-forward list; see scripts/hotfix-disable-smb-forward.md
SEC-003 2026-05-15 WAN port forwards removed; Tailscale-only access
SEC-004 2026-05-15 Unknown port forward deleted
SEC-005 2026-05-15 WiFi SSID → VLAN mapping corrected
SEC-006 2026-05-12 recordurbate accept-routes fixed
SEC-007 2026-06-19 ACL GitOps workflow + secrets
SEC-008 2026-05-15 2FA verified; SEC-003 closed
SEC-009 2026-06-21 dr-public-edge.md — tabletop proven (Cloudflare token rotation, Traefik ACME, Authentik backup restore paths)